and the West, and this may have been part of the rationale. However, it was clear that the potential for economic reconstruction and development based on the largesse of Europe and the United States was foremost on the minds of Russia's leaders. Had Asia been the region with the potential for massive funding of Russia's reconstruction, then the Pacific-not the Atlantic-may have been the focus of Moscow's diplomatic efforts in the first years of the Russian Federation.
This was not the case, and so Asia was less of a priority in the first couple of years of the first Yeltsin administration. To be sure, the newly formed Central Asian republics, because of their geographical location, and because of the existence of the large Russian diaspora in these nations, were necessarily higher on the hierarchy of Moscow's diplomatic strategy. Former partners in Asia, however, such as China, India, Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam, were relegated to the lower rungs of Moscow's strategic thinking in the early years of the Yeltsin presidency. Japan, because, of its dynamic economy and its accepted position among the West's rich, developed nations, 1 was accorded some attention in the early months of Boris Yeltsin's first term. In fact, in his memoirs Kozyrev wrote about Russia's relations with Japan in the section devoted to Russia's relations with Europe and the United States. Discussions of China and India were left in the chapter devoted to Asia.
2 Yeltsin and Kozyrev were preoccupied with developing a foreign policy devoted almost exclusively to the Euro-Atlantic community in the first year of the independent Russian Federation.
The rest of the Russian establishment, meanwhile, was engaged in an intense debate about the future of Russia's foreign policy, and indeed of the future of Russia itself, both as a governing entity and as a society. It took considerable time for large segments of the Russian leadership to understand that the epoch of bipolar stability-with all of its strong points and shortcomings-had come to an end, along with the institutionalized dialogue based on the strained, yet semi-normal Soviet-American relationship. The "de-institutionalization" of strategic thinking, 3 along with the slow and painful realization of Russia's reduced, largely regional, political role took the form of public disputes over with whom to make friends-Europe, the United States, or the former Soviet republics. These republics (along the fringes of Europe and Central Asia) were naturally Russia's closest neighbors, yet they were not necessarily the closest of allies to Russia. East Asia was hardly ever mentioned in Russian political debates, and few saw in the region either a preferential partner, or a developmental model worth imitating.
Debates between Russian Atlanticists and Eurasianists-well covered by Western and Russian political writings in the mid-1990s-hardly signified clashes between pro-Western and anti-Western orientations in
